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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because of 
the untimely filing of appellant's notice of appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Standard of Appellate Review 
Since this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this appeal, 
there is no need to apply any standard of review. Should this 
Court decide, however, that it has jurisdiction, the standard of 
review is as follows: This appeal from a summary judgment 
presents only questions of law and this Court reviews the lower 
court's ruling for correctness and accords no particular 
deference to the conclusions reached by the trial court. Madsen 
v. United Television, Inc., 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 3 (Utah 1990). 
Issues 
1. Does this Court lack jurisdiction over this appeal due 
to the untimely filing of appellant's notices of appeal? 
2. Was the district court correct in ruling that 
defendants/appellants Utah State Bar (Bar) and Sydnie Kuhre 
(Kuhre) (collectively defendants) are not subject to the Archives 
and Records Services and Information Practices Act and that 
Neerings has no cause of action against defendants for their 
alleged violation of the Act? 
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3. If the Act is construed to apply to defendants, does it 
violate Article V of the Constitution of Utah? 
4. Was the district court correct in ruling that there is 
no right of privacy created by the Constitution of Utah? If 
there is such a right, was it violated in this case? 
5. Was the district court correct in ruling that the 
internal policies and procedures of the Bar do not create a right 
of privacy in favor of Neerings? 
6. Was the district court correct in ruling that Neerings 
failed to establish all necessary elements of a common law cause 
of action for invasion of privacy? 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. sections 63-2-59 through 
63-2-89 (1953 as amended) , a copy of which is included in the 
addendum, are determinative of the issues relating to Neerings1 
first cause of action. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action involving four causes of action seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and exemplary 
damages, and attorney's fees based on defendants1 alleged 
unauthorized disclosure to members of the public of the results 
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of Neerings1 bar examination and the results of his appeal of the 
examination results. 
Course of Proceedings 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to all 
four of Neerings1 causes of action. That motion was granted by 
the lower court. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, 
granted defendants1 motion for summary judgment. 
Statement of Facts 
1. February 25-27, 1988 — Neerings took the Utah State Bar 
examination (Record (hereafter "R."), p. 80 at para. 8; R. , p. 
387, Deposition of R. Owen Neerings (hereafter "Neerings depo."), 
p. 14) . 
2. March 25, 1988 — Neerings telephoned the bar office and 
was informed that he failed the bar examination (R. , p. 81 at 
para. 11; Neerings depo., p. 14). 
3. Neerings alleges that approximately one week before 
being informed that he failed the bar examination, Kuhre 
disclosed Neerings1 bar examination results to her friend, Jan 
Fasselin (Fasselin), Neerings1 co-worker at the Regency Theater 
(R., p. 81 at para. 12; Neerings depo., pp. 17 and 24). Although 
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defendants dispute that such disclosure was made, they accept 
Neerings' allegation as true for purposes of this appeal. 
4. Neerings subsequently appealed the results of his bar 
examination to the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar. 
A hearing was held with respect to that appeal on or about May 
17, 1988, On May 18, 1988, the Board of Commissioners issued a 
decision denying Neerings1 appeal. Neerings learned on the 
afternoon of May 25, 1988 that the appeal had been denied (R., p. 
81 at paras. 13 and 14; Neerings depo., pp. 44 and 45). 
5. Neerings alleges that approximately one week before 
being informed of the results of the appeal, Kuhre disclosed the 
results to Fasselin (R. , pp. 81 and 82 at para. 15; Neerings 
depo., pp. 44 and 45). Although defendants dispute that such 
disclosure was ever made, they accept Neerings1 allegation as 
true for purposes of this appeal. 
6. January 12, 1989 — By minute entry, the district court 
ruled that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted 
(R., p. 204). 
7. January 20, 1989 — Neerings filed "Motion/Request for 
Findings11 in the district court requesting the court, pursuant to 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to issue a brief 
written statement of the grounds for its decision granding 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment (R., pp. 205 and 206). 
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8. February 1, 1989 — Neerings filed in the district court 
a motion for a new trial and to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R., pp. 210 and 211). 
9. February 6, 1989 — The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of defendants (R., pp. 213 and 214). 
10. March 9, 1989 — Neerings filed a notice of appeal in 
the district court (R., p. 240). 
11. March 15, 1989 — The district court entered an order 
denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial and to amend judgment 
(R., pp. 243 and 244). 
11. November 1, 1989 — The district court entered an order 
disposing of Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings11 (R. , pp. 376 
and 377). 
12. November 16, 1989 -- Neerings filed a notice of appeal 
in the district court (R., p. 384).1 
1This was the fourth notice of appeal filed by Neerings. 
The first, filed March 9, 1989, was filed 31 days after entry of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants and six days before entry 
of the order denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial and to 
amend judgment. The second notice of appeal was filed June 6, 
1989 (R. , p. 256), 120 days after entry of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants and 83 days after entry of the order denying 
Neerings1 motion for a new trial and to amend judgment. The 
third notice of appeal was filed September 27, 1989 (R., p. 357), 
23 3 days after entry of summary judgment and 19 6 days after 
entry of the order denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Neerings failed to file a timely notice of appeal and this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
The Archives and Records Services an£ Information Practices 
Act was not intended to apply to the judicial branch of state 
government. The Bar falls under the judicial branch and is not 
subject to the Act- Neerings1 cause of action premised on 
defendants1 alleged violation of the Act is without merit. 
If the Act is construed to apply to defendants, it is an 
impermissible intrusion into the exclusive province of this Court 
to regulate the practice the law and violates Article V of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
The Constitution of Utah contains no provision giving rise 
to a right of privacy. Neerings1 cause of action based on an 
alleged violation of a right of privacy under the Constitution of 
Utah is without merit. 
The internal policies and practices of the Bar do not create 
in Neerings a right of privacy which would not otherwise exist. 
His cause of action based on such a right of privacy is without 
merit. 
Neerings failed to establish the "publicity" element of a 
common law right of privacy. In any event, the matter which was 
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the subject of the alleged "publicity11 was not a private matter. 
Additionally, the matter publicized was not of a kind which would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The district court's 
ruling that Neerings failed to establish all elements of a common 
law cause of action for an invasion of privacy should be 
affirmed. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure2 provides 
that the notice of appeal "shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from." Timely filing of the notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional; failure to file within the 30-day 
period prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., State In Re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The order granting defendants1 motion for summary judgment 
was entered by the trial court on February 6, 1989. All four of 
Neerings1 notices of appeal were filed more than 3 0 days after 
entry of that order. Unless the time for filing a notice of 
2At the time of the events in this case, the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court were in effect. Those rules were supplanted 
on April 1, 1990 by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Since 
the two sets of rules are identical in all material respects, 
reference will be made herein solely to the current Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
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appeal was extended, Neerings1 notices of appeal are not timely 
and this Court lacks jurisdiction. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that if one of four enumerated motions is timely filed in the 
trial court, "the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying" that motion. Any notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of such a motion is without 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within 3 0 days 
following entry of the trial court order disposing of the motion, 
Neerings filed a timely motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the Rule 
4(b) motions which extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
On March 15, 1989, the trial court entered an order denying that 
motion. Under Rule 4(b), Neerings1 first notice of appeal, filed 
March 9, 1989, was premature and without effect. Under Rule 
4(b), Neerings had 30 days after entry of the order denying his 
motion for a new trial to file a new notice of appeal. Neerings1 
second, third, and fourth notices of appeal were filed 83, 196, 
and 246 days respectively after entry of the order denying 
Neerings1 motion for a new trial. None of those notices of 
appeal was timely. 
In addition to the Rule 59(b) motion for a new trial, 
Neerings also filed in the district court a "Motion/Request for 
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Findings." In previous motions before this Court, Neerings has 
argued that the "Motion/Request for Findings" is one of the 
motions enumerated in Rule 4(b) which extend the time for filing 
a notice of appeal. Specifically, Neerings argues that the 
"Motion/Request for Findings" is a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that the time for filing 
his notice of appeal is extended until 3 0 days after entry of the 
order disposing of the motion/request. 
The sole issue this Court needs to resolve with respect to 
jurisdiction is whether Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings" 
is in reality a Rule 52(b) motion. If it is, Neerings1 fourth 
notice of appeal, filed November 16, 1989, is timely, since it 
was filed within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of 
Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings."3 If the motion/request 
is not a Rule 52(b) motion, its filing does not extend the time 
for filing a notice of appeal and Neerings1 fourth notice of 
appeal was not timely, having been filed far more than 3 0 days 
after entry of the order denying the motion for a new trial. 
JThe order disposing of Neerings1 "Motion/Request for 
Findings" was entered November 1, 1989. Two previous orders 
disposing of the motion/request had been entered but were 
subsequently set aside by the trial court due to procedural 
irregularities (See, R., pp. 248, 266-271, 274-276, 297-299, 326-
327, 349-356, 362-369, 373-375). 
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This Court should determine that Neerings! "Motion/Request 
for Findings" is not a Rule 52(b) motion for two reasons. First, 
the face of the motion/request indicates that it is not a Rule 
52(b) motion* Second, Neerings himself did not consider it as a 
Rule 52(b) motion. 
Language of the Motion/Request 
Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings" was filed eight days 
after the district court's minute entry ruling that defendants' 
motion for summary judgment should be granted. The 
motion/request argued that defendants had set forth five 
arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment but 
that the court's minute entry "did not specify which, if any, of 
the defendants' grounds asserted the Court relied upon." The 
motion/request then stated as follows: 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
require findings of fact in support of summary judgment 
motions, however subsection (a) of that rule requires 
that "The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules ... 56, ... when the motion is 
based on more than one ground." 
The motion/request then requested the trial court "to issue 
a brief written statement of the ground(s) for its decision 
granting the defendants summary judgment herein." Nowhere did 
the motion/request cite or purport to be pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
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Nowhere did the motion/request ask the court to amend its 
findings or make additional findings, as provided in Rule 52(b). 
Indeed, such a request would have been inappropriate since the 
court never entered any findings. The motion/request was nothing 
more than what it purported on its face to be: a request pursuant 
to Rule 52(a) that the court issue a brief written statement of 
the grounds for its decision granting defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment. Such a motion is not one of those listed in 
Rule 4(b) as extending the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
Neerings did not consider the motion/request as a Rule 52(b) 
motion 
As indicated above, Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings11 
requested the district court to issue a brief written statement 
identifying the grounds upon which it relied in granting 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment. On February 15, 1989, 
the district court, by minute entry, responded to the 
motion/request and issued the brief written statement it had 
requested (R., p. 227). 
During the three months that followed, Neerings made no 
effort to have an order entered with regard to his 
"Motion/Request for Findings.11 Neerings was apparently satisfied 
with the district court's minute entry giving him the brief 
written statement his motion/request had requested. Neerings had 
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filed his notice of appeal and apparently considered the case to 
be at the appellate review stage. 
What Neerings considered his motion/request to be suddenly 
changed, however, when defendants filed in this Court their 
motion to dismiss Neerings1 appeal based on the argument that his 
first notice of appeal was filed prematurely and was without 
effect. The day after defendants filed their motion to dismiss, 
Neerings began efforts in the district court to transform the 
Rule 52(a) motion/request, with no effect on the time for filing 
a notice of appeal, into a Rule 52(b) motion, which extends the 
time for filing a notice of appeal. Such belated efforts do not 
change the fact that Neerings himself did not consider his 
motion/request to be a Rule 52(b) motion. 
The timeline on the next page illustrates the salient facts 
of this case with regard to the question of this Court's 
jurisdiction. The 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal 
began to run on March 15, 1989 when the district court entered 
its order denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial. Under Rule 
4(b), Neerings1 first notice of appeal, filed before that order 
was entered, was premature and without effect. Neerings1 second, 
third, and fourth notices of appeal were filed far more than 3 0 
days after entry of the order denying Neerings1 motion for a new 
trial and were not timely. Neerings failed to file a timely 
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notice of appeal, and th i s Court lacks jurisdict ion to hear th is 
appeal. 
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B. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO 
THE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES 
AND INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT 
Neerings1 first cause of action in his amended complaint is 
based on the provisions of the Archives and Records Services and 
Information Practices Act, Utah Code Ann- section 63-2-59 et seq. 
(1953 as amended) (the Act). In connection with their motion for 
summary judgment in the trial court, defendants argued that they 
were not subject to the Act since the Bar falls under the 
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judicial branch of state government and the Act was not intended 
to apply to the judicial branch. As a consequence, Neerings had 
no cause of action against defendants based on their alleged 
violation of the Act. The trial court granted defendants' motion 
for summary based on that argument. The ruling of the trial 
court is correct and, if this Court decides that it does not lack 
jurisdiction, that ruling should be affirmed. 
In 1981, this Court, exercising its inherent power4 to 
regulate the practice of law (see, In Re Disciplinary Action of 
McCune, 717 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1986)), adopted the Rules for 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar (Rules for 
Integration). In Re Integration and Governance of the Utah State 
Bar, 632 P. 2d 845 (Utah 1981). Pursuant to the Rules for 
Integration, this Court "perpetuate[d], create[d] and continue[d] 
under the direction and control of [the] Court an organization 
known as the Utah State Bar." Rules for Integration, Rule (A) 1 
(emphasis added). Having been created by this Court and 
operating under its direction and control, the Bar falls under 
the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of state government. 
4The inherent power to regulate the practice of law was made 
explicit in 1985 when Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution was amended to provide that the "supreme court by 
rule shall govern the practice of law." 
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The language of the Act manifests a clear intention that its 
provisions do not apply to the judicial branch. Section 63-2-79 
of the Act states as follows: 
Upon request, the archivist shall assist and advise the 
establishment of records-management programs in the 
legislative and judicial branches of state government 
and shall, as required by them, provide program 
services similar to those available to the executive 
branch of state government pursuant to the provisions 
of this act. 
Neerings argues in his brief that although the records-
management provisions of the Act may not apply to the judicial 
branch, the information practices provisions of the Act5 are not 
so limited. Neerings1 argument ignores provisions of the Act 
which indicate otherwise. For example, section 63-2-85.3 
provides that the executive director of the Department of 
Administrative Services shall promulgate rules which apply to 
state systems of data on individuals and which shall provide for 
the implementation of the enforcement and administration of 
certain standards. Among those standards is the following: 
bUtah Code Ann. sections 63-2-85.1 through 63-2-85.4. 
Before 1979, the information practices provisions were found in 
the Utah Information Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. sections 63-
50-1 through 63-50-10e In 1979, the Legislature repealed the 
Utah Information Practices Act and amended the Archives and 
Records Service Act, Utah Code Ann. sections 63-2-59 through 63-
2-87, to include information practices provisions similar to 
those previously found in the Utah Information Practices Act. 
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(1) Collection of data on individuals . . . shall be 
limited to that necessary for the administration and 
management of programs enacted by the Legislature or by 
executive order, 
(Emphasis added.) 
Additionally, the information practices provisions impose 
certain responsibilities on "responsible authorities" as defined 
in the Act. The Act's definition of "responsible authority" is 
as follows: 
"Responsible authority" means any state office or state 
official established by law or executive order as the 
body responsible for the collection, use, or 
supervision of any set of data on individuals or 
summary data. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As indicated above, the Bar was created by the Rules for 
Integration adopted by this Court in 1981. It was not 
established by law or executive order. The Act was not intended 
to apply to the Bar, an arm of the judicial branch. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the rules promulgated by 
the executive director of the Department of Administrative 
Services pursuant to authority granted in the Act (Utah Code Ann. 
section 63-2-85.3). Those rules are located in the Utah 
Administrative Code, Rules R3-1, R3-2, and R3-3. Rule 3-2-1 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
This rule shall apply to all state agencies.... This 
rule applies to state offices and state officials which 
are established by law or executive order as 
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responsible for the collection or use of any set of 
data on individuals or summary data.... This rule and 
related Archives are not mandatory for the Legislative 
and Judicial branches of State government except as 
provided by law. Those branches may adopt or not adopt 
this rule and related procedures or parts thereof as 
they desire. 
(Emphasis added.) 
While an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute 
is not necessarily conclusive, it should be given considerable 
weight. E.g., Bayle v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 700 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1985) ("The construction of a 
statute by the governmental agency charged with its 
administration will be given considerable weight by this 
Court."); Concerned Parents of Step-children v. Mitchell, 645 
P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982) ("Judicial deference is usually 
accorded an agency's interpretation of a statute which that 
agency is charged with enforcing.,"); and Wells Fargo Armored 
Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 626 P.2d 450, 
451 (Utah 1981) ("[S]ome deference is due interpretation of a 
statute placed on it by the adminstrative agency which has the 
responsibility for administering that statute."). 
Despite the plain language of the Act indicating that it 
does not apply to the judicial branch, Neerings argues in his 
brief that the Bar is a "state agency" and is therefore subject 
to the Actc Neerings cites a Tenth Circuit Court case where the 
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court held that for purposes of the "state action" analysis under 
42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Bar is a "state agency." Neerings 
concludes that the Bar must also be a "state agency" for purposes 
of the Act. 
Designation of the Bar as a "state agency" in one context 
does not dictate its status in another context. See, e.g., 
Washington State Bar Association vs. Graham, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash 
1976). The critical inquiry is whether the Bar is a "state 
agency" as that term is defined and used in the Act. 
"State agency" is defined in the Act as "a department, 
division, board, bureau, commission, council, institution, 
authority, or other unit, however designated, of the state." 
Utah Code Ann. section 63-2-61(2). At first blush, this 
definition appears sufficiently broad to include the Bar. The 
context within which the term is found within the Act, however, 
makes it clear that the term does not include the judicial 
branch. 
The records-management provisions of the Act impose certain 
duties on the head of each "state agency." E.g. , Utah Code Ann. 
section 63-2-77. As discussed above, however, the records-
management provisions clearly apply only to the executive branch 
of state government. Section 63-2-75 provides that "the 
archivist shall establish and administer in the executive branch 
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of state government a records management program..." (emphasis 
added). Section 63-2-79 states that the records-management 
program is optional with the legislative and judicial branches of 
government. Use of the term "state agency" in the context of a 
records-management program intended to apply only to the 
executive branch manifests a clear intention that the term "state 
agency" relates only the executive branch. The Bar is not a 
"state agency" as that term is defined and used in the Act. 
Even if the Bar were considered to be a "state agency" as 
defined by the Act, Neerings would nevertheless have no basis for 
his cause of action premised on the Act. Neerings1 claim is 
based on an alleged violation of either section 63-2-85.3(4) or 
section 63-2-85.4(4).6 Both of those provisions, however, set 
forth obligations imposed upon a "responsible authority" as 
defined in the Act. As discussed above, the Bar is not a 
"responsible authority", as that term is defined in the Act, and 
is not subject to the obligations imposed by those sections. 
Nowhere in those sections is there any indication that they apply 
to a "state agency." Even if the Bar were considered a "state 
6These were the only two provisions cited by Neerings in his 
brief which could possibly have been violated by the defendants1 
alleged disclosure of Neerings1 bar examination and appeal 
results. 
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agency11, therefore, no liability could be imposed for an alleged 
violation of those sections. 
The Act was not intended to apply to the Bar, an arm of the 
judicial branch of state government. The district court1s 
summary judgment in favor of defendants should be affirmed. 
C. IF THE ACT IS CONSTRUED TO APPLY 
TO THE BAR, IT VIOLATES ARTICLE V 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Even assuming that the Act was intended to apply to the Bar, 
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendants was 
correct and should be affirmed. If the Act were construed to 
impose requirements on the Bar, the Act would constitute an 
impermissible intrusion by the Legislature into the exclusive 
province of the judicial branch of government, in violation of 
Article V of the Constitution of Utah. 
As discussed above, inherent in the judicial authority of 
the Utah Supreme Court is the power to regulate the practice of 
law. Article V section 1 of the Constitution of Utah provides 
that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of [the other branches of government] shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others...." 
The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this 
state are independent of each other. None can exercise the 
powers of the others. This not only prevents an assumption by 
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one department of power not belonging to it but also prohibits 
the imposition by one of any duty upon the others not within the 
scope of its jurisdiction. It is the duty of each department to 
abstain from and not encroach on the powers of the other 
departments. Power must be exercised by the department to which 
it naturally belongs. Each department has the "inherent right to 
accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that 
department." In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assc., 2 75 
N.W. 265, 266 (Neb. 1937). 
Several cases support the conclusion that application of the 
Act to the Bar would violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
In Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W. 2d 275 (Minn. 1973), the 
Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a statute which sought to 
divert state bar membership dues into the general revenue fund of 
the state and subject these funds to legislative appropriation. 
The court held that despite past acquiescence in regulatory 
statutes relating to the practice of law, this statute was 
unconstitutional as an unlawful usurpation of judicial power 
under the separation of powers doctrine. The court noted that 
some of the statutory provisions were well motivated and that the 
court might wish to adopt some of the provisions by rule but that 
the statutes were nevertheless not a permissible legislative 
prerogative. id. at 280. The separation of powers doctrine 
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prevents an assumption by the legislature of powers properly 
belonging to the judiciary. Id. at 279. To permit the statute 
to stand would result in usurpation by the legislature of the 
judicial function of regulating the practice of law. The court 
stated that "the power to make the necessary rules and 
regulations governing the Bar was intended to be vested 
exclusively in the Supreme Court, free from the dangers of 
encroachment either by the legislative or executive branches." 
Id. at 2 80. 
In In Re Washington State Bar Assoc. , 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 
1976), the court powerfully asserted its inherent judicial 
authority to govern the legal profession and the practice of law. 
In that case, the state auditor was prohibited from auditing the 
state bar pursuant to a statute which required the audit of 
"state agencies." The holding was based on the principle that 
"the regulation of the practice of law in this state is within 
the inherent power of this Court." JEd. at 315. This decision 
extended to the bar association the court's power to administer 
its own funds without legislative or executive interference. The 
auditor was denied access to the bar association's records 
because the bar association was considered to be part of the 
judicial branch and therefore free to spend its funds as it saw 
fit. 
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In Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 
1980), the state auditor attempted to audit the books and 
accounts of the state bar association. The court held that the 
auditor had no power to audit these funds since they were under 
the exclusive control of the judiciary. In Kentucky, state 
statutes regulated the practice of law. The court held that 
these statutes were superceded by a 1975 amendment to the state 
constitution which in relevant part was almost identical to the 
1985 amendment to the judicial article of the Constitution of 
Utah. The amendment provided that "the Supreme Court shall, by 
rule, govern admission to the Bar and the discipline of members 
of the Bar.11 Id. at 684. The court held that the constitutional 
amendment completely removed the subject of regulation of the Bar 
from any legislative authority and rendered obsolete the statutes 
pertaining to it. The court held the statutory provisions void 
because they purported to erect powers and limitations that did 
not fall within the legislative province. Xd. See also, Pasik 
v. State Board of Law Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. 1984) 
(The court held that plaintiff, who sought certain information 
from the New York Bar concerning his bar examination pursuant to 
provisions of the freedom of information law, was not entitled to 
the information since the judiciary was exempted from the law and 
the Bar was a part of the judiciary.). 
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Similarly, to the extent the Act purports to apply to the 
Bar, it is an impermissible intrusion by the Legislature into the 
exclusive province this Court in the exercise of its judicial 
function to regulate the practice of law. Accordingly, the Act 
cannot constitutionally be applied to the Bar. The district 
court's summary judgment in favor of defendants was correct and 
should be affirmed. 
D. THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH DOES NOT 
CREATE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS ALLEGED 
BY NEERINGS; EVEN IF SUCH A RIGHT EXISTS, 
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT VIOLATED IT 
In his second cause of action, Neerings alleges that 
"defendants have failed to comply with the Utah Constitutional 
right with regard to privacy and have violated the plaintiff's 
right to privacy by giving members of the public private and 
confidential information regarding the plaintiff" (R., pp. 84 and 
85 at para* 28) . The district court granted defendants summary 
judgment as to this cause of action. The district court's ruling 
is correct and should be affirmed. 
A thorough review of the Constitution of Utah reveals no 
provision giving rise to a right of privacy as alleged by 
Neerings. There is no Utah case law establishing that such a 
right arises from the Constitution of Utah. The only right of 
privacy existing under the Constitution of Utah is that stemming 
from Article I section 14, relating to unreasonable searches and 
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seizures. That provision clearly has no application to this 
case. 
In his brief, Neerings argues that such a right exists 
because the Legislature referred to a "constitutional . . . right 
of privacy" in the legislative intent section, Utah Code Ann. 
section 63-2-60(2,) of the Archives and Records Services and 
Information Practices Act.7 The Legislature's reference to such 
a right does not create it where it otherwise does not exist 
under the provisions of the Constitution of Utah. There simply 
is no provision in the Constitution of Utah establishing such a 
right of privacy. 
Neerings also argues in his brief that this Court recognized 
a "right to privacy" in the case of Redding v. Brady, 606 P. 2d 
1193 (Utah 1980) . In referring to the right of privacy, the 
Court in Redding cited United States Supreme Court cases 
involving the right of privacy under the federal constitution. 
The right of privacy mentioned by the Court in Redding is that 
arising under the federal constitution, not under the 
Constitution of Utah. 
Even assuming that a right of privacy exists under the 
Constitution of Utah as alleged by Neerings, there has been no 
7It is not clear whether the Legislature was referring to a 
right of privacy under the Constitution of Utah or under the 
Constitution of the United States. 
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invasion of that right in this case. Disclosure of public 
information cannot be deemed to be a violation of any right of 
privacy. 
In this case, Neerings alleges that defendants disclosed the 
results of his bar examination. Even if defendants made such a 
disclosure, the information was readily available to at least 
some members of the public. Neerings himself agreed that anyone 
taking the bar examination at the same time would have known that 
he failed the examination when his name did not appear in the 
published list of names of those who passed (Neerings depo., pp. 
31 and 32). 
No right of privacy exists under the Constitution of Utah. 
Even if such a right exists, it has not been violated in this 
case. This Court should affirm the summary judgment in favor of 
defendants. 
E. THE INTERNAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF 
THE BAR DO NOT CREATE A RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY IN NEERINGS 
In his third cause of action, Neerings alleges that the 
Bar's internal policies, practices, rules, and regulations give 
rise to some right of privacy in favor of Neerings (R. , pp. 85 
and 86) . The district court granted defendants summary judgment 
as to this cause of action. The lower courtfs ruling was correct 
and should be affirmed. 
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There is no authority for the proposition that the Bar's 
internal policies and practices create a right of privacy in 
favor of Neerings which would not otherwise exist. As discussed 
in section F below, the facts of this case do not give rise to a 
cause of action for a violation of Neerings1 common law right to 
privacy. Any right of privacy Neerings may have is defined by 
law, not by the Bar's internal policies and procedures. 
In his brief, Neerings cites several cases in support of the 
proposition that generally accepted practices within a profession 
are relevant to establish the standard of care (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 28). Those cases have no application to this case, 
where Neerings alleges not that the Bar's policies and practices 
give rise to a standard of care but that they give rise to a 
right of privacy. In any event, this case involves only the 
practices and internal policies of the Bar. There is nothing in 
this case to suggest that the Bar's policy of not disclosing bar 
examination results is the standard of care within the 
profession. The summary judgment in favor of defendants should 
be affirmed. 
F. NEERINGS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
ALL ELEMENTS OF A COMMON LAW 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Neerings1 fourth cause of action alleges an invasion of his 
common law right of privacy. The district court agreed with 
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defendants1 argument that Neerings failed to establish all 
elements of such a cause of action and granted defendants summary 
judgment. The district court's ruling was correct and should be 
affirmed. 
Neerings1 cause of action for invasion of his common law 
right to privacy is based upon the provisions of the Restatement 
(2d) of Torts, section 652D (1977), which was at least impliedly 
approved by this Court in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). 
That section provides as follows: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the 
private life of another is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 
With regard to the publicity given to a matter concerning 
the private life of another, comment (a) of section 652D states 
as follows: 
"Publicity" means that the matter is made public, by 
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many 
persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public 
knowledge.... The difference is not one of the means 
of communication ... [but] one of a communication that 
reaches, or is sure to reach the public. 
In Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986), Eddy sued his 
employer for invasion of privacy under section 652D. Only a 
limited number of Eddy's co-workers heard that he was undergoing 
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psychiatric treatment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
These facts, even when taken in the light most 
favorable to Eddy do not amount to "publicity" in the 
sense of a disclosure to the general public — the 
extent of publicity required in order to give rise to 
an action for public disclosure of private facts. 
Id. at 78. 
The Kansas Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 
Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250 (Kan. 1985). In that case, 
plaintiff's psychiatrist wrote a letter to a judge in the 
plaintiff's divorce action expressing concern for the danger 
which the plaintiff posed to herself and to her children. Citing 
comment (a) to section 652D, the court stated that "it is 
doubtful that these facts would support a finding that the letter 
was given the necessary publicity required to sustain this 
claim." Jd. at p. 1256. The court quoted comment (a), stating 
that "it is not an invasion of the right of privacy ... to 
communicate a [private fact] to a single person or to even a 
small group of persons." Id. 
In this case, the alleged disclosure of Neerings1 bar 
examination results and the results of his appeal was made to one 
person: Fasselin. That disclosure does not rise to the level of 
the "publicity" required by section 652D. 
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Even if sufficient "publicity" occurred, the matter that was 
the subject of the alleged disclosure was not a private matter. 
As indicated above, anyone taking the bar examination at the same 
time Neerings took it or who was aware that he took it would know 
he failed when his name was not included in the published list of 
those who passed. 
Moreover, even assuming the "publicity" element is present, 
the matter which was allegedly publicized—failure of the bar 
examination—was not of a kind which "would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person" as required by section 652D. Because 
this and other elements of a common law cause of action for 
invasion of privacy are lacking, the district court's summary 
judgment in favor of defendants was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request 
the Court to affirm the district court's summary judgment in 
favor of defendants. 
Dated this 11th day of July, 1990. 
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responsible for collecting or administering the 
account. 
(2) The state shall comply with the procedures and 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudica-
tive proceedings. 1987 
63-la-6. Abstract of order is a lien. 
(1) An abstract of an order of a hearing examiner 
stating a default may be filed with the State Tax 
Commission, and when filed, constitutes a lien to the 
extent of the receivable plus interest against any 
state income tax refund or overpayment due or to 
become due the debtor for a period of eight years from 
the date of the order, unless satisfied or otherwise 
released in writing by the state. 
(2) The lien created by this section shall, for the 
purposes of Section 59-10-529 only, be considered a 
judgment, but no credit of a tax refund or overpay-
ment may be made on account of this lien until 20 
days after the date of the hearing examiner's order. 
1987 
63-la-7. Judicial review — Effect on lien. 
(1) A judicial review of an order of a hearing exam-
iner may be obtained by any party filing a complaint 
with the district court. 
(2) A notice of the filing of a complaint may be filed 
with the State Tax Commission. If notice is filed, the 
tax commission may take no action with respect to 
the lien created by Section 63-la-6 until the matter is 
finally disposed of by the courts, except as provided in 
this chapter. 1987 
63-la-8. Bond required — Terms — Expenses of 
debtor. 
(1) If a complaint is filed by the debtor for a judi-
cial review of an order entered under this chapter, the 
debtor shall furnish a bond to the State Tax Commis-
sion, with good and sufficient sureties, in the amount 
of the delinquent receivable or the amount of any 
overpayment or refund due, whichever is less, unless 
waived by the court. The lien created by Section 
63-la-6 is then dissolved as to that overpayment or 
refund and the overpayment or refund shall be re-
leased to the debtor. 
(2) The bond shall provide that the surety will pay, 
upon a final determination adverse to the debtor, the 
amount of the bond or any other lesser amount as the 
court may determine, to the State Tax Commission 
for the use and benefit of the entity of state govern-
ment obtaining the order. 
(3) If the judicial review finds the claim of the state 
invalid, the state shall reimburse the debtor all rea-
sonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred. 1986 
63-la-9. Rules for implementing chapter. 
The Board of Examiners may adopt rules for the 
implementation of this chapter, including rules for 
the conduct of hearings and appointment of hearing 
examiners. 1986 
CHAPTER 2 
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES 
Section 
63-2-1 to 63-2-58. Repealed. 
63-2-59. Short title. 
63-2-60. Legislative intent. 
63-2-61. Definitions. 
63-2-62. Creation — Archivist and records ad-
ministrator — Appointment — Quali-
fications. 
Section 
63-2-62.5. Archivist charged with custody of docu-
ments. ' 
63-2-63. Powers and duties of archivist. 
63-2-64. Transfer of archives from public offices. 
63-2-65. Records declared property of state — 
Disposition. 
63-2-66. Access to public records — Certified cop-
ies. 
63-2-67. Records located in public offices — Right 
of archivist to inspect, to replevin. 
63-2-68. State Records Committee created — 
Composition — Meetings — Executive 
secretary. 
63-2-68.1. State Records Committee — Classifica-
tion authority and duties. 
63-2-69. Records of public offices — Disposition. 
63-2-70. Microphotography off state records — 
Standards. 
63-2-71. Use of materials to preserve public 
records. 
63-2-72. Repealed. 
63-2-73. Public records — disposal by state 
agency without approval prohibited. 
63-2-74. Repealed. 
63-2-75. Establishment of records-management 
program in executive branch. 
63-2-7(5. Records-management program — Duties 
of archivist. 
63-2-77. Records-management program — Duties 
of state agencies. 
63-2-78. Other governing bodies to promote prin-
ciples of efficient records management 
— Archivist to assist with local pro-
grams. 
63-2-79. Records management — Archivist to as-
sist legislative and judicial branches if 
requested. 
63-2-80. Purchases of filing and microfilm equip-
ment — Approval, and standards. 
63-2-81 to 63-2-83. Repealed. 
63-2-84. Charges for state publications. 
63-2-85. Repealed. 
63-2-85.1. Identification of authorities collecting or 
using data. 
63-2-85.2. Report on information practices — Con-
tents. 
63-2-85.3. Rules. 
63-2-85.4. Rights of individuals on whom data 
stored — Data in dispute, procedure. 
63-2-86. Rules. 
63-2-87. Violation of act a misdemeanor. 
63-2-88. Violation of act — Liability for damages 
— Injunction. 
63-2-89. Exemptions from act 
63-2-90, 63-2-91. Repealed. 
63-2-1 to 63-2-58. Repealed. 
1963,1965,1969,1972, 
1974.1977,1979,1980,1981 
63-2-59. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Archives and Records 
Services and Information Practices Act." 1985 
63-2-60. Legislative intent 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to create a 
central archives and records service within the De-
partment of Administrative Services to administer 
the archives, records management, and information 
system programs of the state and to apply fair, effi-
cient, and economical management methods to the 
collection, creation, utilization, maintenance, reten-
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tion, preservation, disclosure, and disposal of state 
records and documents. 
(2) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes 
two fundamental constitutional rights: (a) the right of 
privacy in relation to personal data gathered by state 
agencies, and <b) the public's right of access to infor-
mation concerning the conduct of the public's busi-
ness. It is the intent of the Legislature to establish 
fair information practices to prevent abuse of per-
sonal information by state agencies while protecting 
the public's right of easy and reasonable access to 
unrestricted public records. 1885 
63-2-61. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Public records" means all books, papers, 
letters, documents, maps, plans, photographs, 
sound recordings, management information sys-
tems, or other documentary materials, regardless 
of physical form or characteristics, made or re-
ceived, and retained by any state public office 
under state law or in connection with the trans-
action of public business by the public offices, 
agencies, and institutions of the state and its 
counties, municipalities, and other political sub-
divisions. The term "public records" does not in-
clude preliminary drafts or personal notes made 
or received, and retained by the public agency in 
the ordinary course of business, unless, in the 
opinion of the State Records Committee, a public 
interest in subjecting these records to the classifi-
cation procedures of this act clearly outweighs 
the public interest in exempting them from clas-
sification, and unless the records, or the data, or 
class of data in these records is otherwise con-
trolled by law. 
(2) "State agency" means a department, divi-
sion, board, bureau, commission, council, institu-
tion, authority, or other unit, however desig-
nated, of the state. 
(3) "Public offices" and "public officers" mean, 
respectively, the offices and officers of any court, 
department, division, board, commission, bureau, 
council, authority, institution, or other agency of 
the state or any of its political subdivisions. 
(4) "Archivist" means the state archivist and 
records administrator. 
(5) "State publication" or "publication" means 
any document, compilation, journal, law, resolu-
tion, blue book, statute, code, register, pamphlet, 
book, report, hearing, legislative bill, leaflet, or-
der, rule, directory, periodical, or magazine is-
sued in print by the state, any officer of the state, 
the Legislature, or any state agency. 
(6) "Records committee" means the State 
Records Committee. 
(7) "Data on individuals" means all records, 
files, and processes which contain any data on 
any individual and which are kept or intended to 
be kept by state government, including, but not 
limited to, that data by which it is possible to 
identify with reasonable certainty the person to 
whom the information pertains. 
(8) "Responsible authority" means any state 
office or state official established by law or execu-
tive order as the body responsible for the collec-
tion, use, or supervision of any set of data on 
individuals or summary data. 
(9) "Summary data" means statistical records 
and reports derived from data on individuals but 
in which individuals are not identified and from 
which neither their identities nor any other char-
acteristic that could uniquely identify an individ-
ual is ascertainable. 
(10) "Public data" means data on individuals 
collected and maintained by state government 
which is not classified as private data or confi-
dential data under this chapter and is therefore 
open to the public, unless otherwise exempted or 
restricted from disclosure by law. 
(11) "Confidential data" means data on indi-
viduals collected and maintained by state gov-
ernment which is available only to appropriate 
agencies for the use specified in Subsection 
63-2-85.3 (1) and to others by express consent of 
the individual, but not to the individual himself. 
(12) "Private data" means data on individuals 
collected and maintained by state government 
which is available only to the appropriate state 
agencies for the uses specified in Subsection 
63-2-85.3 (1), to others by the express consent of 
the individual, and to the individual himself or 
next of kin when information is needed to ac-
quire benefits due a deceased person. 
(13) "Classification" means a determination 
made under this act by a responsible authority or 
the State Records Committee designating data 
on individuals or a system of state records con-
taining data on individuals as public data, pri-
vate data, or confidential data. 
(14) "Record series" means a group or system 
of public records which may be treated as a unit 
for purposes of description, management, or dis-
position. 1985 
63-2-62. Creation — Archivist and records ad-
ministrator — Appointment — Qualifi-
cations. 
iThere is created in the Department of Administra-
tive Services a centralized archives and records ser-
vice which shall administer the state's archives and 
records management programs, including storage of 
reteords, central microfilm lab processing, and micro-
film quality control. The executive director of the De-
partment of Administrative Services, with the ap-
proval of the governor, shall appoint an archivist and 
records administrator who is qualified by archival ed-
ucation, training, and experience to direct the Divi-
sion of Archives and Records. 1985 
60-2-62.5. Archivist charged with cus tody of 
documents. 
JThe archivist is charged with custody of the follow-
ing: 
(1) the enrolled copy of the constitution; 
(2) the acts and resolutions passed by the Leg-
islature; 
(3) all books, records, deeds, parchments, 
maps, and papers kept or deposited with the ar-
chivist pursuant to law; 
(4) the journals of the Legislature, and all 
bills, resolutions, memorials, petitions, and 
claims introduced in the Senate or the House of 
Representatives; 
(5) oaths of office of all state officials; and 
(6) descriptions of seals in use by the different 
state officers. The archivist shall furnish such 
officers with new seals whenever required. 1984 
63-2-63. Powers and duties of archivist. 
(1) The archivist shall staff and organize the ar-
chives and records service to administer the following 
functions as provided by this act: 
(a) the state archives; 
(b) a records management program; 
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(c) centra l microfilm laboratory processing 
and microfilm qual i ty control; and 
(d) information practices. 
(2) The executive director of administrative ser-
vices may direct t h a t other functions or services for 
which t he executive director is responsible be admin-
is tered by the archives and records service. 1885 
63-2-64. Transfer o f archives from public of-
fices. 
The archivist shall administer the Utah State Ar-
chives. The archivist shall be the official custodian of 
all noncurrent public records of permanent and his-
toric value which are not required by law to remain 
in the custody of the agency of origin. This custodian-
ship includes both physical possession and legal title. 
Unless otherwise directed by law, all records of any 
public office in the state shall, upon the termination 
of the existence and functions of that office, be trans-
ferred to the custody of the archivist. 1985 
63-2-65. Records declared property of state — 
Disposit ion. 
All public records made or received by or under the 
authori ty of or coming into the custody, control or 
possession of public officials of this state in the course 
of their public duties are the property of the state and 
shall not be mutilated, destroyed, transferred, re-
moved or otherwise damaged or disposed of, in whole 
or in part , except as provided by law. 1969 
63-2-66. A c c e s s to publ ic records — Certified 
copies. 
The archivist shall keep the public records in ar-
chives' custody in such arrangement and condition as 
to make them accessible, unless otherwise restricted 
by law, for convenient use and shall permit them to 
be inspected, examined, abstracted, or copied at rea-
sonable times under his supervision by any person. 
The archivist shall , upon the demand of any person, 
furnish certified copies upon payment in advance of 
reasonable fees as determined by the director of the 
Department of Administrative Services. Copies of 
public records transferred under law from the office of 
origin to the custody of the archivist when certified 
by the archivist under the seal of the Utah State Ar-
chives have the same legal force and effect as if certi-
fied by their original custodian. 1985 
63-2-67. Records located in public offices — 
Right of archivist to inspect, to re-
plevin. 
The archivist, in person or through a deputy, shall 
have the right of reasonable access to and examina-
tion of all public archives in Utah, with a view to 
securing their safety and preservation. The attorney 
general, on behalf of the state of Utah or the archi-
vist, may replevin any public records which are not 
adequately protected or cared for or which were for-
merly par t of the records or files of any public office of 
the terri tory or s ta te of Utah. 1968 
63-2-68. State Records Committee created — 
Composit ion — Meetings — Executive 
secretary. 
There is created a State Records Committee com-
posed of the archivist, the state auditor, the director 
of the Division of State History, the attorney general 
or his designee, and a citizen member appointed by 
the governor at the recommendation of the members 
of the committee. The records committee shall meet 
at least once every quarter to review the policies and 
programs for the collection, classification, retention, 
disclosure, and disposal of state records. The archivist 
shall serve as executive secretary of the records com-
mittee. 1985 
63-2-68.1. State Records Committee — Classifi-
cation authority and duties. 
The State Records Committee has the following 
classification authority and duties: 
(1) to review the designations made by a re-
sponsible authority and to reclassify any data on 
individuals or systems of data on individuals 
maintained by state agencies, upon petition by 
the responsible authority, by the individual who 
is the subject of the data, or by any interested 
party, except as otherwise provided by law; 
(2) to initiate at its own discretion the designa-
tion and classification of data on individuals or 
systems of data on individuals maintained by 
state agencies, except as otherwise provided by 
law; 
(3) to adopt rules regulating its own meetings 
and procedures consistent with Chapter 4, Title 
52, on open and public meetings, and any other 
applicable provision of law; and 
(4) upon request, to make atailable to the leg-
islative and judicial branche$ of state govern-
ment, and political subdivisions of the state, the 
classification review which ij; is authorized to 
perform by this act. i985 
63-2-69. Records of public offices — Disposi -
tion. 
Every custodian of public records of the s ta te shall 
submit to the records committee, in accordance with 
s tandards established by the archivist, schedules pro-
posing the length of t ime each records series should 
be retained. No records series may be destroyed with-
out the prior approval of the records committee. The 
records committee shall determine whether the 
records in question are of administrative, legal, fiscal, 
research, or historical valuer Those records 
unanimously determined to be of ho adminis t ra t ive , 
legal, fiscal, research, or historical value shall be dis-
posed of by any method the records committee may 
specify. A list of all records so disposed of, together 
with a statement certifying compliance with th i s act, 
signed by members of the records committee, shal l be 
filed and preserved in the offic^ from which the 
records were drawn and in the files of each of the 
other officers who are signatories to the certificate. 
Records having future value may be transferred to 
the Utah State Archives. Public records in the cus-
tody of the archivist may be disposed of upon a simi-
lar determination by the records committee and the 
head of the agency from which ttye records were re-
ceived. 1985 
63-2-70. Microphotography of! state records — 
Standards. 
Public records may be microphotographed when it 
is determined to be cost effective for the care, main te -
nance, retrieval, security, and preservation of the 
records. The microphotography shall comply wi th the 
minimum standards of quality approved by the 
American National Standards Inst i tute, and the As-
sociation for Information and Image Management . 
Records microphotographed in accordance with these 
standards have the same force and effect as the origi-
nals, including introduction in evidence in all courts 
or administrative agencies. A transcript, exemplifica-
tion, or certified copy made in accordance with this 
section is deemed to be a transcript, exemplification, 
or certified copy of the original. The archives shall 
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keep one copy of microphotographed records at a vital 
records site as prescribed in the s ta te retention sched-
ule. Upon review and approval of the microphoto-
graphed film by the archivist, t he source documents 
may be destroyed. l««5 
63-2-71. Use of materials to preserve publ ic 
records. 
With a view to the preservation of public records, 
the chief procurement officer and public officials shall 
consult with the archivist to assure tha t all paper, 
ink, and other mater ials used in public offices in the 
state for the purposes of pe rmanen t records shall be of 
durable quality. 1981 
63-2-72. Repealed. 1987 
63-2-73. Public records — Disposa l by state 
agency without approva l prohibited. 
No public records shall be destroyed or otherwise 
disposed of by any state agency unless it is deter-
mined by the archivist and the records committee 
that the record has no further adminis t ra t ive , legal, 
fiscal, research, or historical value. 1969 
63-2-74. Repealed. 1985 
63-2-75. Establishment of records -management 
program in execut ive branch . 
The archivist shall establish and adminis ter in the 
executive branch of state government a records man-
agement program which will apply efficient and eco-
nomical management methods to the creation, utili-
zation, maintenance, retention, preservation, and dis-
posal of state records. 1985 
63-2-76. Records-management program — Du-
ties of archivist 
The archivist shall, with due regard for the func-
tion of the agencies concerned: 
(1) establish s tandards, procedures, and tech-
niques for the effective managemen t of records. 
(2) make continuing surveys of active office 
operations and recommend improvements in cur-
rent records-management practices including the 
use of space, equipment, automat ion, and sup-
plies employed in creating, main ta in ing , storing, 
and servicing records. 
(3) establish s tandards for the preparat ion of 
schedules providing for the retention of s ta te 
records of continuing value and for the prompt 
and orderly disposal of s ta te records no longer 
possessing sufficient adminis t ra t ive , historical, 
legal, or fiscal value to w a r r a n t thei r further re-
tention. 
(4) obtain reports from s ta te agencies required 
for the administration of the program. 
(5) establish, mainta in , and operate an ar-
chives and records center t h a t meets federal spec-
ifications for the storing, processing, and servic-
ing of records for s ta te agencies pending their 
deposit with the Utah s ta te archives or their dis-
position in any other manne r prescribed by law. 
(6) establish, maintain , and operate central-
ized microfilm lab processing and microfilm qual-
ity control for s tate agencies. Upon completion of 
a micrographic feasibility s tudy and the approval 
of the archivist, public officers may operate their 
own microfilm services, contract with a private 
vendor, contract with the U t a h Correctional In-
dustries, or contract with the archives to borrow 
a portable camera to do the source document mi-
crofilming. Those part ic ipat ing in these options 
must comply with the s t andards prescribed in 
Section 63-2-70. Processing and developing of mi-
crofilm shall be provided by archives unless oth-
erwise justified and approved by the archivist. 
Microfilm services may also be provided to local 
government agencies and reasonable charges 
made for these services. Where an agency elects 
to operate based on a feasibility study done by 
the archivist , the agency's microfilm processing 
lab and qual i ty assurance work must be done in 
accordance wi th Section 63-2-70. The agency 
mus t give the archives daily sensimeter and 
sensometric reading as to film quali ty. 
(7) establish a forms management program. 
(8) establish a reports and directives manage-
men t program. 
(9) establish a vital records management pro-
gram. 1985 
63-2-77. R e c o r d s - m a n a g e m e n t program — Du-
ties of state agencies. 
The head of each s ta te agency shall: 
(1) establish and mainta in an active, continu-
ing program for the economical and efficient 
managemen t of t he records of the agency; 
(2) appoint a records officer to work with ar-
chives in the care, maintenance, scheduling, dis-
posal, and preservat ion of agency records; 
(3) make and main ta in records containing ade-
qua te and proper documentation of the organiza-
tion, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
and essential t ransact ions of the agency designed 
to furnish information to protect the legal and 
financial r ights of the s ta te and of persons di-
rectly affected by the agency's activities; 
(4) submit to the archivist, in accordance with 
procedures established by the archivist, sched-
ules proposing the length of t ime each state 
record series w a r r a n t s retention for administra-
t ive, legal, or fiscal purposes after it has been 
created or received by the agency; 
(5) cooperate with the archivist in the conduct 
of surveys made by the archivist under this act; 
(6) give notice to the archivist, in accordance 
wi th procedures established by the archivist, of 
classifications determined by the agency for all 
record series and automated systems containing 
personal da ta on individuals; 
(7) comply with the rules and procedures is-
sued by the archivist . 1985 
63-2-78. Other g o v e r n i n g bod ie s to promote 
principles of efficient records manage-
ment — Archivist to assist with local 
programs. 
The governing body of each county, city, town, dis-
tr ict , authori ty , or any public corporation, or political 
en t i ty whether organized and existing under char ter 
OT undeT general l aw shal l promote t h e principles of 
efficient records managemen t for its records. The gov-
e rn ing body shall follow the program established for 
t he managemen t of records by s ta te agencies. The 
archivis t shall , upon the request of a local governing 
body, provide advice and assistance in the establish-
m e n t of a local records management program and 
shal l provide services s imilar to those available to the 
executive branch of s ta te government under th is act. 
1985 
63-2-79. Records management — Archivist to 
assist legislative and judicial branches 
if requested. 
Upon request, the archivist shall assist and advise 
the establishment of records-management programs 
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in the legislative and judicial branches of state gov-
ernment and shall, as required by them, provide pro-
gram services similar to those available to the execu-
tive branch of state government pursuant to the pro-
visions of this act. 1969 
63-2-80. Purchases of filing and microfilm 
equipment — Approval and standards. 
All purchases of microfilm equipment by state 
agencies must be approved by the archivist. The ar-
chivist shall issue standards for the purchase of all 
microfilm equipment and supplies by political subdi-
visions to ensure compatibility of that equipment 
with state equipment and record keeping practices. 
1985 
63-2-81 to 63-2-83. Repealed. 1985 
63-2-84. Charges for state publications. 
The executive director of administrative services 
shall determine the charge, if any, for the purchase of 
any state publications under control of the state ar-
chivist and shall remit daily to the state treasurer all 
moneys received from the sale of such publications. 
1981 
63-2-85. Repealed. 1965 
63-2-85.1. Identification of authorities collecting 
or using data. 
The archivist is directed to identify responsible au-
thorities in state government involved in the collec-
tion or use of data on individuals or summary data. 
1979 
63-2-85.2. Report on information practices — 
Contents. 
(1) On or before December 1 of each year, the ar-
chivist shall prepare a report or a revision of the pre-
vious year's report on information practices for pre-
sentation to the Legislature and to the governor. 
Summaries of the report shall be available to the pub-
lic at a nominal cost. The report shall contain infor-
mation including, but not limited to: 
(a) the name of each record series containing 
public, confidential, and private data on individ-
uals which are kept bj the state, a description of 
the kinds of information contained in them, the 
reason that the data is kept, the use made of the 
data, the source of the data, the categories of in-
dividuals covered by the data, and the categories 
of individuals who will have access to the data in 
the exercise of their duties; 
(b) the title, name, and address of the responsi-
ble authority for each system of public, confiden-
tial, or private data on individuals; 
(c) the policies and practices of the responsible 
authority and the secretary regarding data stor-
age, duration of retention of data, disclosure, and 
disposal of them; 
(d) a description of the provisions for main-
taining the integrity of the data under Subsec-
tion 63-2-85.3 (4); 
(e) the procedures under Section 63-2-85.4 
whereby an individual may: 
(i) be informed if he is the subject of any 
data on individuals in the system; 
(ii) gain access to that data; and 
(iii) contest the accuracy, completeness, 
and pertinence of that data and necessity for 
retaining it; and 
(0 any recommendations concerning appropri-
ate legislation. 
(2) Each responsible authority shall furnish the ar-
chivist with the data set forth in Subsection (1) at a 
time set by the archivist to enable preparation of that 
annual report. 1985 
63-2-85.3. Rules. 
The executive director of the Department of Ad-
ministrative Services, with the recommendation of 
the archivist shall promulgate rules in accordance 
with Sections 63-46a-4 and 63-46a-12. These rules 
shall apply only to state systems of data on individ-
uals or summary data and shall provide for the imple-
mentation of the enforcement and administration of 
the following standards: 
(1) Collection of data on individuals and estab-
lishment of related files of the data in state gov-
ernment shall be limited to that necessary for the 
administration and management of programs en-
acted by the Legislature or by executive order. 
(2) Data on individuals shall be under the ju-
risdiction of the responsible authority identified 
and designated by the archivist. The responsible 
authority shall document and file with the archi-
vist the nature of all data on individuals col-
lected and stored and the need for, and intended 
use of, the data and any other information re-
quired. 
(3) The use of summary data under the juris-
diction of one or more responsible authorities 
shall be permitted, subject to the requirement 
that the data be summarized under the direction 
of, and by, that responsible authority. Requests 
for use of any data shall be in writing, stating the 
intended use. 
(4) Appropriate safeguards shall be estab-
lished in relation to the collection, storage, ex-
change, dissemination, and use of data on indi-
viduals to assure that all data is accurate, com-
plete, and current and that regard for the right of 
privacy is afforded to the individual who is the 
subject of the data. Emphasis shall be placed on 
the data security requirements of computerized 
files which are accessible directly by means of 
telecommunication, including security during 
transmission. 
(5) Data on individuals shall be stored only so 
long as necessary for the administration of au-
thorized programs as authorized by statute or by 
the State Records Committee. 
(6) Safeguards shall be established to facilitate 
access, during reasonable business hours, to pub-
lic records of the state not otherwise exempt from 
public disclosure under state and federal stat-
utes, under administrative rules which imple-
ment them, under judicial decisions, and under 
the classification authority contained in this act. 
1987 
63-2-85.4. Rights of individuals on whom data 
stored — Data in dispute, procedure. 
The rights of individuals on whom data is stored or 
is to be stored and the responsibilities of each respon-
sible authority in regard to that data are as follows: 
(1) The purposes for which the data on individ-
uals is collected and used, or is to be collected and 
used, shall be filed in writing by the responsible 
authority with the archivist and shall be a mat-
ter of public record. 
(2) An individual requested to supply confi-
dential or private data shall be informed of the 
intended uses of that data. 
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(3) Any individual refusing to supply confiden-
tial or private data shall be informed by the re-
questing party of any known consequence arising 
from that refusal. 
(4) No confidential or private data shall be 
used other than for the stated purposes nor shall 
it be disclosed to any person other than the indi-
vidual to whom the data pertains, without ex-
press consent of that individual, except that next 
of kin may obtain information needed to acquire 
benefits due a deceased person. 
(5) Upon request to the responsible authority, 
an individual shall be informed whether he is the 
subject of any data on individuals, informed of 
the content and meaning of that data, and shown 
the data without any charge. The responsible au-
thority shall charge an appropriate fee for any 
additional requests within a six-month period 
unless the requested information is in dispute. 
(6) An individual shall have the right to con-
test the accuracy or completeness of any data on 
individuals which concerns that individual. If 
that data is contested, the individual shall notify, 
in writing, the responsible authority of the na-
ture of the disagreement. Within 30 days from 
that notice, the responsible authority shall either 
correct the data if it is found to be inaccurate or 
incomplete and notify past recipients of the inac-
curate or incomplete data of the change, or shall 
notify the individual of his disagreement with 
the statement of contest. Any person aggrieved 
by the determination of that responsible author-
ity may appeal that determination to the State 
Records Committee and, if still dissatisfied, may 
bring appropriate action under Section 
63-46a-13. Data in dispute shall not be disclosed 
except under conditions required by law or rule 
and only if the individual's statement of dis-
agreement is included with the disclosed data. 
1987 
63-2-86. Rules. 
The archivist, with the approval of the director of 
the Department of Administrative Services, shall 
promulgate rules to implement this act. 1985 
63-2-87. Violation of act a misdemeanor. 
(1) Any person who violates any provision of this 
act is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) Any public employee who willfully violates any 
provision of this act or the rules promulgated under 
the act is subject to suspension without pay or dis-
charge after a hearing as provided by law. 1985 
63-2-88. Violation of act — Liability for dam-
ages — Injunction. 
(1) Any responsible authority who violates any 
provision of this act shall be liable to any person, 
suffering damage as a result thereof, and the person 
damaged may bring an action against the state to 
recover any damages sustained, plus costs incurred 
and reasonable attorney fees. 
(2) Any responsible authority who willfully vio-
lates any provision of this act shall, in addition to 
those remedies provided under Subsection (1), be lia-
ble for exemplary damages of not less than $100 nor 
more than $1,000 for each violation. 
(3) Any responsible authority which violates or 
proposes to violate the provisions of this act may be 
enjoined by any district court in this state. The court 
may make any order or judgment as may be neces-
sary to prevent the use or employment by any person 
of such violations of this act. 1979 
63-2-89. Exempt ions from a c t 
This act does not apply to data on individuals relat-
ing to criminal investigations or records more than 
75 years old. IMS 
63-2-90,63-2-91. Repea led . itti 
CHAPTER 3 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICITY AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
(Repealed by Laws 1953, ch. 123, I 15.) 
63-3-1 to 63-3-17. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 4 
CONSERVATION AND RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION 
Section 
63-4-1. Creation. 
63-4-2. Membership — Expenses — Records — 
Bonds of officers — State to hold prior 
lien on assets. 
63-4-3. Name — State agency. 
63-4-4. Appropriation for treatment of Utah coals 
— Profits conveyed to state — Governor 
and auditor members of board. 
63-4-5. State agencies to provide facilities for as-
sistance. 
63-4-6. Foundation as state agency empowered to 
receive grants of funds. 
63-4-7. "Nonprofit" defined. 
63-4-8. Information secret — Used exclusively for 
benefit of state — Exceptions. 
63-4-1. Creation. 
That a scientific, nonpolitical, nonprofit foundation 
or corporation shall be made an agency of the state of 
Utah for carrying out scientific research and practical 
demonstration of processes and methods for the con-
servation and efficient utilization of the natural re-
sources of the state of Utah and state funds shall be 
granted for such purposes. 1953 
63-4-2. Membersh ip — E x p e n s e s — Records — 
Bonds of officers — State to hold prior 
lien on assets. 
(1) That such foundation or corporation shall be 
composed only of citizens of the state of Utah. 
(2) That such foundation or corporation shall be 
organized under the laws of the state of Utah. 
(3) That such foundation or corporation shall be 
organized as a scientific, nonpolitical, nonprofit re-
search and conservation organization open to all citi-
zens making affirmation that their object in joining is 
and will continue to be, while they remain members 
thereof, the conservation and most efficient utiliza-
tion of the natural resources of the state for the equal 
welfare and benefit of all the citizens of the state. 
(4) No officer or trustee of said foundation shall 
receive any salary or remuneration for services as 
such officer or trustee other than necessary expenses 
incurred in carrying out their duties as officers, such 
expenditures to be approved by the Division of Fi-
nance. 
(5) An exact and complete record of all expendi-
tures of funds appropriated by the state shall be kept 
and reported to the Division of Finance for each quar-
terly period, and that the books and records of the 
corporation shall be subject to an audit by the state 
